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A THEORY OF INSURANCE POLICY 
INTERPRETATION 
Kenneth S. Abraham* 
The first principle of insurance law is captured by the maxim con­
tra proferentem, which directs that ambiguities in a contract be inter­
preted "against the drafter,"1 who is almost always the insurer.2 Yet 
given the modern recognition that language is an inherently imperfect 
instrument for communicating meaning, insurance policy provisions are 
in a sense always ambiguous. Moreover, in addition to contra profer-
* Class of 1962 Professor of Law and John V. Ray Research Professor, University 
of Virginia School of Law. A.B. 1967, Indiana University; J.D. 1971, Yale. - Ed. I am 
grateful to participants in workshops at the Law Schools of Indiana University (Bloom­
ington), the University of Michigan, and the University of Virginia for helpful com­
ments on an earlier version of this article. In the interest of full disclosure, it should be 
noted that on occasion I have served as a consultant to attorneys representing policy­
holders in insurance coverage disputes. 
1. See KENNETH s. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 38-47 (2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW]; 3 
ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 559 (1960 & Supp. 1996); E. All.AN 
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 518-19 (2d ed. 1990); ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDER­
STANDING INSURANCE LAw § 25C, at 105 (1987); ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN l 
WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW§ 6.3(a)(2) (Practitioner's ed. 1988); JEFFREY w. STEM­
PEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS: LAW AND STRATEGY FOR IN­
SURERS AND POLICYHOLDERS § 5.2, at 180-81 (1994). 
2. In fact, insurance policie� are so commonly drafted by insurance companies that 
the principle is routinely transformed into a rule that ambiguities in an insurance policy 
are to be interpreted in favor of coverage. See KEETON & Wm1ss, supra note 1, 
§ 6.3(a)(2), at 630 n.6 (" '[W]here semantically possible the policy will be construed to 
achieve its manifest objective of indemnifying the insured against the type of losses to 
which the policy relates.' " (quoting Spaid v. Cal-Western States Life Ins. Co., 182 Cal. 
Rptr. 3, 5 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982))); James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Sub­
ject to Special Rules of Interpretation?: Text Versus Context, 24 Aruz. ST. LJ. 995, 
1003 (1992) ("[T]o the general rule that the contract should be construed as a whole 
. . . we add the insurance rule that 'where two interpretations equally fair may be 
made, that which affords the greatest measure of protection to the insured will pre­
vail.' " (quoting Maxon v. Security Ins. Co., 29 Cal. Rptr. 586, 590 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1963))); Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Interpretations of Contract Disputes: Toward a 
Realistic Middle Ground Approach, 51 Omo ST. LJ. 543, 567 (1996); Stephen J. Ware, 
A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1461, 1464-65 
(1989) ("Virtually all courts follow this rule and construe ambiguities in an insurance 
contract against the insurer, in favor of coverage."); see also STEMPEL, supra note l, 
§ 5.2, at 184 (noting that the goal of risk spreading weighs in favor of finding coverage 
"absent clear language to the contrary" when invoking contra proferentem). 
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entem, policyholders may invoke such allied doctrines as waiver, estop­
pel, and the rule that the reasonable expectations of the insured should 
be honored even if those expectations are unambiguously contradicted 
by fine-print provisions in the policy.3 Contra proferentem and these 
other doctrines are so frequently invoked by the courts in insurance 
cases4 that the casual observer might well suppose that the true first 
principle of insurance law is that insurance disputes are generally re­
solved in favor of coverage. Indeed, in light of all these pro-coverage 
legal doctrines, it is surprising that insurers ever win disputes involving 
the meaning of policy provisions. 
But of course insurers very often win coverage disputes, including 
those in which a policy provision is allegedly ambiguous. Contra 
proferentem is not merely a label for pro-coverage results reached for 
other reasons. Rather, the process of interpreting insurance policies can­
not be adequately understood without recognizing the way in which 
contra proferentem helps to explain decisions both for and against poli­
cyholders. Similarly, by their own terms the doctrines of waiver and es­
toppel and the expectations principle have nothing to do with "interpre­
tation" as it is normally understood. These doctrines direct that under 
specific circumstances the meaning of even clear policy language must 
be disregarded, not interpreted. But there remains a vague sense on the 
part of many observers of insurance law that these doctrines, which cre­
ate rights "at variance" with policy provisions,5 nevertheless have 
something to do with interpretation, though precisely what has always 
been difficult to articulate. 
In this article I analyze and explain how the courts actually employ 
contra proferentem and its allied doctrines in interpreting insurance pol­
icies by uncovering the factors that I believe most influence the process 
of interpretation. This effort exposes some of the diffic;ulties that the 
courts have encountered in employing contra proferentem as the doc­
trine has evolved. I suggest, further, that the rise of the allied doctrines 
creating rights at variance with policy provisions at least in part reflects 
the courts' effort to grapple directly with the problems that they have 
been able to address only incompletely and indirectly under the rubric 
of contra proferentem. So conceived the allied doctrines are not, strictly 
3. See KEETON & Wmrss. supra note 1, §§ 6. l(a) -(b), at 614-21. 
4. To make a rough estimate of just how frequently contra proferentem alone is  in­
voked, I performed a Westlaw search within the "Insurance" topic, in the state database 
alone, for opinions containing the term "ambig!" in the same paragraph as "policy" or 
"language" or "provision" or "provisions." The search disclosed 4416 opinions con­
taining this language decided between 1980 and 1995. 
5. See KEETON & Wmrss, supra note l, §§ 6.l(a)-(b), at 61 4-15.  
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speaking, a feature of the interpretive process, but a consequence of that 
process. 
To summarize my argument briefly, I contend that the mislead­
ingly simple notion that ambiguous policy provisions should be inter­
preted in favor of coverage is comprised of two separate features: the 
linguistic standard against which the ambiguity of the disputed policy 
provision is judged, and the strength of policyholders' demand for the 
coverage that would be afforded by a pro-coverage interpretation of the 
policy provision in question. To complicate matters further, there are 
two ways to employ each of these two separate features. Consequently, 
what I call the "traditional" conception of contra proferentem is just 
one of four possible approaches to the interpretation of an arguably am­
biguous policy provision. Although the courts typically talk as if they 
are applying the traditional conception, in fact they sometimes apply 
one of the other three. 
Although my effort to understand how contra proferentem works is 
largely descriptive, it also has a nonnative component. The nonnative 
implication of my analysis is that courts are likely to get themselves 
into a variety of difficulties when they depart from the traditional con­
ception of contra proferentem. Therefore, courts probably would do 
well to get back to basics and put out of the way many of the compli­
cated considerations that have implicitly influenced their interpretation 
of insurance policies. At the same time, courts determined to depart 
from the traditional conception should be more candid about the scope 
and limits of their dep�es. I suggest a number of ways in which 
such courts could make their approaches more open and workable. 
I. THE Pu!u>OSE OF CONTRA PROFERENTEM 
To understand what the courts are actually doing when they inter­
pret ambiguous policy provisions, it is useful to first consider the nor­
mative basis of the doctrine. After identifying the purpose (or purposes) 
of contra proferentem, we can then attempt to analyze the manner in 
which the doctrine functions. 
Why might the law require that ambiguous insurance policy provi­
sions be interpreted in favor of coverage? The justification that the 
courts typically offer is that the drafter of an ambiguous policy provi­
sion should bear responsibility for ambiguity because the drafter has 
control over the language used in the policy.6 The notion of control as 
the basis for responsibility, however, is itself ambiguous. On the one 
6. See, e.g., Vargas v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 838, 841 (2d Cir. 1981). 
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hand, the notion may imply that ambiguous policy provisions are the re­
sult of faulty behavior by the insurer and that contra proferentem im­
poses something like liability for negligent drafting. On this view, con­
tra proferentem imposes liability on insurers for employing 
unreasonably unclear policy provisions - provisions which do not have 
an optimal degree of clarity.7 
On the other hand, the notion of control as the courts use it in their 
justifications for contra proferentem may imply responsibility without 
necessarily implying fault. This understanding of the connection be­
tween control and responsibility makes contra proferentem more closely 
resemble a version of strict liability. Like strict liability generally, im­
posing liability on insurers for including ambiguous provisions in their 
policies whether or not such provisions are unreasonably unclear might 
serve purposes that include, but extend beyond, those served by impos­
ing liability only for unreasonably unclear policy provisions. For exam­
ple, because of the difficulty and cost of determining the optimal degree 
of clarity in policy provisions, a strict liability standard may be superior 
to negligence in terms of both cost and accuracy. Furthermore, it seems 
likely that insurers in general rather than policyholders will be better 
bearers of the cost of the irreducible component of ambiguity that re­
mains after optimal clarity is achieved. 8 
Whether the notion that control warrants responsibility is under­
stood as negligence or as strict liability, however, there is missing from 
this bare notion a connection between the "breach" of employing an 
ambiguous policy provision and the harm that results from that breach. 
There are a number of possible connections. In contra<?t-law terms, the 
application of contra proferentem to an ambiguous policy provision 
might be understood as the awarding of expectation damages for breach 
of the "promise" of coverage afforded by the ambiguous provision.9 
7. Technically speaking, the optimal degree of clarity would minimize the sum of 
maldrafting costs plus maldrafting avoidance costs. Maldrafting costs consist primarily 
of the losses resulting from reliance by policyholders on the "false" promise of cover­
age afforded by ambiguous policy provisions. Maldrafting avoidance costs consist pri­
marily of the drafting costs necessary to reduce or eliminate ambiguities. 
8. See RICHARD A. POSNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 107 (4th ed. 1992) 
(noting that contra proferentem assures policyholders that they have coverage if they 
misinterpret an ambiguous policy provision). 
9. One might also understand the invocation of contra proferentem as ordering 
specific performance. Like expectation damages, specific performance is intended to 
compensate the expectation interest of the promisee. See L.L. Fuller & William R. Per­
due, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt. 1), 46 YALE LJ. 52, 54 (1936) 
(arguing that both specific performance and expectation damages protect the expectation 
interest by seeking to "put the plaintiff in as good a position as he would have occupied 
had the defendant performed his promise"); Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Per-
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This answer highlights the distinction between expectation and reliance 
damages. Why interpret an ambiguous policy provision against the 
drafter unless the policyholder would have behaved differently had he 
known that the loss in question was not insured? The same issue can be 
expressed in tort-law terms as a question of causation: Why is the poli­
cyholder not required to show that the coverage claimed could have 
(perhaps even would have) been purchased elsewhere? 
In contract law, the generic answer to this kind of question is that 
reliance is often difficult and costly to prove, 10 and that promisees are 
systematically undercompensated for the losses they suffer from 
breaches by promisors.11 To encourage reliance, contract law typically 
dispenses with the requirement that it be proved. The same might be 
true of reliance by policyholders on the "promise" of coverage afforded 
by ambiguous policy provisions. If policyholders generally rely on these 
kinds of promises, it may be sensible to dispense with the requirement 
that reliance be proved - especially if such proof would be difficult 
and expensive. 
In tort law similar answers are given when proof of causation is 
not required, though the causation requirement is relaxed much less fre-
formance, 89 YALE LJ. 271, 272 (1979) (noting that specific performance is ordered 
when damages are inadequate to protect the expectation interest). Of course in the in­
surance context the two remedies are not merely equivalent - they are identical. 
10. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 9, at 60 (noting, in reference to the reliance 
interest in foregone opportunities, that "the impossibility of subjecting this type of reli­
ance to any kind of measurement may justify a categorical rule granting the value of the 
expectancy as the most effective way of compensating for such losses "); Michael B. 
Kelly, The Phantom Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1755, 
1761; Stewart Macaulay, The Reliance Interest and the World Outside the Law Schools' 
Doors, 1991 WIS. L. REv. 247, 249-50; W. David Slawson, The Role of Reliance in 
Contract Damages, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 197, 220-22 (1990). 
11. See George M. Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 VA. L. REv. 
1225, 1249-50 (1994) ("Both advocates and critics of the reliance measure have pointed 
to the fact that the expenditure measure courts most often use when awarding reliance 
damages only imperfectly compensates the promisee's 'reliance interest' because lost 
opportunities are not included .... "); Slawson, supra note 10, at 219 ("Even by their 
own measure, reliance damages undercompensate in practice .... [The plaintiff] is ac­
tually compensated only for his out-of-pocket expenses and receives nothing for his lost 
opportunities."). 
Even expectation damages frequently do not achieve the compensation goal. See 
Macaulay, supra note 10, at 250 ("[R]equiring damages to be foreseeable and proved 
with reasonable certainty means that courts often will not protect all of a person's rea­
sonable expectations."); Schwartz, supra note 9, at 274-78 (arguing that all contract 
damages are so often undercompensatory that the availability of specific performance 
should be greatly expanded). For a criticism of this concern with undercompensation, 
see Cohen, supra, at 1310-11 (arguing that "damages are undercompensatory when un­
dercompensation is necessary to provide the parties with better incentives to take pre­
cautions or to mitigate; that is, compensation is an incidental concern"). 
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quently than its contract analogue, reliance. When proof of individual 
causation is expensive and difficult, but it is clear that the defendant 
harmed an indeterminate group of victims, individual proof sometimes 
is not required.12 Moreover, when the defendant is more likely to have 
access to evidence that could disprove causation than the plaintiff is to 
have access to evidence that could prove causation, the burden of proof 
m11y be shifted.13 And it is increasingly recognized in tort-law theory 
that proof of causation, far from being a moral or logical imperative, is 
just one simple and useful way of adding up the costs that a system de­
signed to promote optimal deterrence of loss should take into account in 
deciding when to impose liability.14 The analo� to contra proferentem 
is that ambiguous policy provisions often harm policyholders even 
when pinpointing how is difficult. Requiring proof of causation there­
fore could be both expensive and counterproductive - if the losses of 
policyholders who would be denied coverage because they relied on 
ambiguous provisions but could not prove reliance would exceed the 
gains of those who at present receive coverage under contra profer­
entem even though they did not rely. By further analogy to tort law, it 
might follow that, when insurers have it within their power to disprove 
causation, they should be allowed to escape liability by doing so -
perhaps by showing that the policyholder claiming coverage did not 
rely on the ambiguous provision. 
12. See, e.g., Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Div., 495 F.2d 213, 218 (6th Cir. 1974) 
(finding that when a plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to prove the portion of a 
single hann caused by each independent tortfeasor, defendants will be held jointly and 
severally liable unless a defendant can prove the portion of hann for which it is respon­
sible); Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980) (holding that when a plaintiff 
could not identify the individual manufacturer of the DES that caused her injury, each 
individual defendant would be liable for a share of the judgment proportional to its mar­
ket share unless it could disprove causation). 
13. See Michie, 495 F.2d at 218; Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d l, 4 (Cal. 1948); 
Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687, 690 (Cal. 1944). In Summers v. 'lice, the court held 
that when two defendants acted negligently and the act of one caused the plaintiff hann, 
each defendant bore the burden of disproving causation, and in the absence of such 
proof they were jointly and severally liable: 
When we consider the relative position of the parties and the results that would 
flow if plaintiff was required to pin the injury on one of the defendants only, a 
requirement that the burden of proof on that subject be shifted to defendants be­
comes manifest. . . •  Ordinarily defendants are in a far better position to offer evi­
dence to determine which one caused the injury. 
Summers, 199 P.2d at 4. 
14. See Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for 
Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 69, 85 (1975); Steven Shaven, An Analysis of 
Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463, 465-
66 (1980). 
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This analysis provides plausible but empirically speculative justifi­
cations for contra proferentem. The question is whether (and if so, to 
what extent) the courts have employed contra proferentem in accor­
dance with these justifications. In Parts II and III, I describe the factors 
that have influenced decisions in which contra proferentem is invoked 
and attempt to show the ways in which these factors are and are not 
congruent with the normative case for contra proferentem. In Part IV, I 
explain the way in which the allied doctrines of waiver, estoppel; and 
the reasonable expectations principle mesh with this analysis. Finally, in 
Part V, I explore the difficulties that would be faced by courts should 
they candidly and explicitly depart from the traditional conception of 
contra proferentem, and examine several devices that the courts might 
employ to cabin these departures. 
II. THE Two DIMENSIONS OF CONTRA PROFERENTEM 
Because so much turns on whether a disputed policy provision is 
ambiguous, the first step in understanding insurance policy interpreta­
tion must be to discover the standards employed in assessing ambiguity. 
In _my view the ambiguity decision seems so result-oriented to casual 
observers primarily because this decision involves two different and in­
frequently expressed dimensions of assessment. Moreover, not only do 
different courts subscribe to different standards in making these two as-· 
sessments: the same courts also apply different standards from case to 
case. The first dimension of assessment is what I call the "linguistic 
standard of care"; the second dimension involves the degree of policy­
holder demand for the coverage in question. 
A. The Linguistic Standard of Care 
The first inquiry courts make to determine whether to invoke con­
tra proferentem i n  one sense involves exactly what one would expect: 
scrutiny of the language of the policy provision whose meaning is at is­
sue. The hornbook rule is that a policy provision is ambiguous if it is 
reasonably susceptible to two meanings.15 But in fact courts do not al­
ways apply this test. On some occasions, without saying so, courts take 
into account an additional, slightly different factor: whether the insurer 
could have feasibly made the relevant policy language unambiguous. To 
distinguish between these two approaches I will use the same terms I 
used in identifying the normative case for contra proferentem - strict 
liability and negligence. These terms have the decided advantage of be-
15. See STEMPEL, supra note 1, § 5.3, at 186. 
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ing almost automatically understandable to the legal reader, both in 
themselves and in relation to each other. My use of these terms risks the 
disadvantage, however, of carrying some undesirable baggage and im­
precision along with them. Despite this risk, in what follows I use the 
terms as shorthands, without necessarily intending to import into the 
analysis everything that the terms have come to mean in other settings. 
1. Strict Liability: The "Ordinary Reader" Standard 
The strict liability approach to ambiguity is the principal feature of 
the hornbook statement of contra proferentem, enunciated thousands of 
times by courts in every jurisdiction. If a policy provision is "ambigu­
ous" - reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation by the 
ordinary reader of the policy - then the provision is interpreted against 
the drafter and the interpretation more favorable to the insured governs, 
even if the provision could not reasonably be made less ambiguous. 
This strict liability standard circumvents a host of problems that would 
be posed by openly embracing a negligence standard. The most promi­
nent of these would be the need to admit evidence regarding the alter­
native verbal formulations that might have been employed and the po­
tentially numerous considerations that could reasonably have affected 
the choice among them.16 
A strict liability standard may have a more important advantage as 
well. Suppose that the optimal standard of linguistic care were negli­
gence rather than strict liability. If most ambiguous policy provisions 
would be adjudged negligent anyway, then use of a strict liability stan­
dard instead of a negligence standard would reduce the costs of deci­
sion at a relatively low rate of divergence from the negligence standard. 
The traditional conception may therefore both incur low transaction 
costs and be highly cost-effective in achieving the goal of identifying 
sub-optimal policy provisions. 
The difficulty with the strict liability standard, however, is that it is 
opaque. It provides no guidance as to the criteria to be used in deter­
mining when a policy provision is or is not reasonably subject to two 
interpretations. The formulation presupposes something like an "I know 
16. Drawing on the work of Lon Fuller, Professor James Henderson has described 
problems of this type as "polycentric," in that they "present innumerable analytical 
permutations to which the parties would logically be required to address themselves." 
As a consequence, "[m]eaningful participation in the [judicial] decision through formal 
proofs and argument • • .  would be impossible . • . .  Whatever the court might decide, its 
decision would not deserve to be called principled." James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial 
Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 
COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1536 (1973). 
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it when I see it" or "I know what the ordinary reader would under­
stand" test,17 aided perhaps by some other aged maxims of interpreta­
tion.18 The difficulty of determining whether a contract provision is am­
biguous simply by staring at the contract has led some courts in both 
general contract_ law and in insurance law to adopt the "modern" view 
that extrinsic evidence of the meaning that the parties attached to a con-
17. See, e.g., Liggans R.V. Center v. John Deere Ins. Co., 575 So. 2d 567, 571 
(Ala. 1991) (stating that insurance policy unambiguously distinguished between losses 
due to theft and losses due to false pretenses when "theft" is read as an ordinary person 
of average understanding would read the term); McGreehan v. California State Auto. 
Assn., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 235, 238 (Cal. Ct App. 1991) (using the understanding of the or­
dinary person in construing insurance contracts); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Willison, 885 P.2d 
342, 344 (Colo. Ct App. 1994) (stating that an insurance contract must be interpreted 
from the perspective of the ordinary reader); Nugget Oil, Inc. v. Universal Sec. Ins. Co., 
584 So. 2d 1068, 1070 (Fla. Dist Ct App. 1991) ("We are bound to assign to contract 
provisions the meaning that would be attached to them by an ordinary person of aver­
age understanding."); West Trucking Line, Inc. v. Northland Ins. Co., 459 N.W.2d 262, 
264 (Iowa 1990) (noting that because policyholders' underinsured motorist coverage 
unambiguously excluded property damage, the "policy language expressly limits the 
coverage to bodily injury damages and is easily understandable to an ordinary person"); 
Meiners v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 645 A.2d 9, 10 (Me. 1994) (" 'A[n insurance] 
policy is ambiguous if an ordinary person in the shoes of the insured would not under­
stand that the policy did not cover claims such as the [one being] brought' " (quoting 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Elwell, 513 A.2d 269, 271 (Me. 1986))); Sellie v. North Dakota Ins. 
Guar. Assn., 494 N.W.2d 151, 157 (N.D. 1992) (holding that in a dispute between in­
surer and insured a court is concerned with what the "ordinary person's understanding 
of the policy would be" (quoting Sparks v. Republic Natl. Life Ins. Co., 647 P.2d 1127, 
1135 (Ariz. 1982))); Pressman v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 574 A.2d 757, 760 (R.I. 
1990) ("[T]he terms should be read in the same sense that the insurer had reason to be­
lieve would be the way they would be interpreted by the ordinary reader and 
purchaser."). 
18. For example, courts occasionally employ the maxim "inclusio unius est ex­
clusio alterius" or "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" (the inclusion or expression 
of one is the exclusion of another) to determine the meaning of ambiguous policy lan­
guage. See, e.g., Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Inc. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 713 
F.2d 254, 258 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding that under the maxim expressio unius, the omis­
sion of contractholders from a list of parties who need not consent to a contract term 
amendment, together with a provision apparently granting to the insurer an absolute 
right to amend, created an ambiguity in the policy); Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New 
York v. Commander, 231 F.2d 347, 351 (4th Cir. 1956); Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 283 
S.E.2d 227, 230 (W.Va. 1981) ("Not only does the rule of strict construction against the 
insurance company apply but the familiar rule that the specific inclusion of one subject 
excludes all others is also applicable."); cf. Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New 
York, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 177-78 (Cal. 1962) (en bane) (noting that the invocation of ex­
pressio unius amounts to recognition of an ambiguity in the contract, but that the 
maxim should not be invoked to defeat the "rule that ambiguous terms should be con­
strued against the insurer because it is a legalistic concept that does not enter the under­
standing of the ordinary layman); Marcolini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 278 A.2d 796, 799 
(Conn. 1971) (holding the maxim expressio unius "should not be used to create an 
ambiguity"). 
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tract term may be admitted not only after the term is determined to be 
ambiguous, but also in order to prove that the term is ambiguous.19 
Unfortunately, this development merely shifts the locus of uncer­
tainty. In the absence of criteria for assessing the purported ambiguity 
of a policy provision, extrinsic evidence may or may not aid resolution 
of the issue. In cases involving negotiated contract language, proof of a 
mutually "intended" meaning different from an "objective" meaning 
might serve as an effective test. In such cases evidence that the parties 
subjectively intended the disputed language to mean something different 
from its otherwise objective, unambiguous meaning may tend to show 
that the language is ambiguous. But in the insurance context, in which 
standard-form policy language is virtually always at issue, there is 
rarely a mutually intended "subjective" meaning, provable with extrin­
sic evidence, that differs from the otherwise unambiguous "objective" 
meaning of the policy language in question.20 In short, strict liability ei­
ther involves an almost completely intuitive judicial judgment about the 
susceptibility of disputed policy language to more than one interPreta­
tion, or masks the courts' use of a different, unarticulated standard. 
2. Negligence: The Perfectibility Standard 
If strict liability were always the standard employed in invoking 
contra proferentem, then insurers would win far fewer cases than they 
19. See, e.g., Taylor v. State Fann Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 854 P.2d 1134, 1140-41 
(Ariz. 1993) (en bane); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging 
Co., 442 P.2d 641, 645-46 (Cal. 1968); Fire Ins. Exch. v. Rael, 895 P.2d 1139, 1143 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1995); Denny's Restaurants, Inc. v. Security Union Title Ins. Co., 859 
P.2d 619, 626 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Continental Ins. Co. v. Paccar, Inc., 634 
P.2d 291 (Wash. 1981)). In Pacific Gas, the court stated: 
The fact that the terms . . .  appear clear to a judge does not preclude the possibil­
ity that the parties chose the language of the instrument to express different 
terms . . . .  Accordingly, rational interpretation requires at least a preliminary con­
sideration of all credible evidence offered to prove the intention of the parties . . •  
. If the court decides, after considering this evidence, that the language of a con­
tract • . .  is 'fairly susceptible of either one of the two interpretations contended 
for,' extrinsic evidence relevant to prove either of such meanings is admissible. 
Pacific Gas, 442 P.2d at 645-46 (citations omitted). 
20. Such problems exist in the general contract context as well. See Charles J. 
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interac­
tions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REv. 261, 268-69 
(1985). It is worth noting, however, that a number of prominent courts in recent insur­
ance cases have consulted extrinsic evidence in an effort to discern the meaning of dis­
puted policy provisions. See, e.g., Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P. 2d 
878, 891 (Cal. 1995) (en bane) (using evidence of drafting history); Morton Intl., Inc. v. 
General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831, 847-48 (NJ. 1993) (using evidence 
of representations made in the course of effort to secure regulatory approval of a 
provision). 
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do. I do not believe, however, that when insurers defeat ambiguity 
claims they do so because the court has capriciously decided not to in­
voke contra proferentem. Rather, in some of the cases in which courts 
employ strict liability discourse, a more limited form of liability that re­
sembles a negligence standard actually guides the decisionmaking pro­
cess. Because this standard remains unarticulated, its contours are not 
entirely clear. But in essence the standard seems to require not only that 
the policy provision at issue be susceptible to more than one reasonable 
interpretation, but also that it be feasible to perfect the policy language 
sufficiently to eliminate the ambiguity. 
1\vo versions of a perfectibility standard are embedd.ed in the case 
law. The "hindsight" approach asks whether, at the time of the cover­
age dispute, the policy provision in question could have been perfected. 
For example, standard CGL (first "Comprehensive," then "Commer­
cial" General Liability21) insurance policies for decades have covered 
liability payable "as damages" because of bodily injury or property 
damage. After CERCLA22 was enacted in 1980 and the Environmental 
Protection Agency began to order cleanup of waste deposit sites pursu­
ant to its authority under the statute, many of the companies that were 
the recipients of cleanup orders claimed coverage under their CGL in­
surance policies for the costs of cleanup. In response to such claims, in­
surers argued that a policyholder incurring costs to comply with an ad­
ministrative cleanup order or a judicial injunction had not been 
subjected to liability payable "as damages." Often the courts held, 
however, that cleanup costs incurred by policyholders in response to 
such orders are covered by CGL policies because (among other things) 
the phrase "as damages" is ambiguous.23 These courts considered it ir­
relevant that at the time the applicable policies were sold, CERCLA had 
been neither enacte4 nor anticipated. The question in these cases was 
not whether the insurer could reasonably have foreseen the enactment 
I 
of CERCLA, but whether, with hindsight, the phrase "as damages" 
21. See ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAw, supra note l, at 448. 
22. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 
1980, Pub., L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat 2767 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
26, 33, 42, and 49 U.S.C.). 
23. See, e.g., AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 799 P.2d 1253, 1278 (Cal. 1990); 
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co., 535 N.E.2d 1071, 1080 
(Ill. App. Ct 1989); Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 555 N.E.2d 
576, 583 (Mass. 1990); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers lndem. Co., 457 
N.W.2d 175, 179-81 (Minn. 1990); C.D. Spangler Constr. Co. v. Industrial Crankshaft 
& Engg. Co., 388 S.E.2d 557, 569 (N.C. 1990). 
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could have been perfected so as to achieve the insurers' purported inter­
pretation more clearly.24 
In contrast, a "foresight" perfectibility standard looks not only to 
the quality of the policy language in dispute, but also to the reasonable­
ness of the insurer's failure - at the time the policy was drafted - to 
perfect that language. For example, occasionally a decision invoking 
contra proferentem notes how simple it would have been for the insurer 
to draft a clearer provision: "Where the risk is well known and there 
are terms reasonably apt and precise to describe it, the use of substan­
tially less certain phraseology, upon which dictionaries and common 
understanding may fairly differ, is likely to result in interpretations 
favoring coverage rather than exclusion. "25 Although such reasoning 
does not expressly invoke a foresight perfectibility standard, it presup­
poses one. Otherwise it would be irrelevant that the risk was "known" 
and that the provision in question could have been drafted more 
clearly.26 
Openly formulating and applying a perfectibility standard - espe­
cially a foresight standard - would be a far more complex exercise 
than is required under strict liability. A strict liability standard is self­
applying, even if it is not self-defining. But a perfectibility standard re­
quires both definition and factual application to the policy provision at 
hand. On some occasions neither is difficult because the negligent draft­
ing merely involves the failure of the insurer to include simple, straight­
forward language. For example, in Vlastos v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire 
Insurance Company,21 the court dismissed the insurers' argument that 
the disputed policy provision was unambiguous in part because "the in­
surers easily could have precluded doubt by the addition of one 
word."28 
24. This test lies about midway between strict liability and negligence in the tort­
law sense. The former does not require perfectibility, as does the hindsight-perfectibility 
test, but neither does the hindsight test require foresight, as does a pure negligence test. 
25. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 368 F. Supp. 
1098, 1118 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), ajfd., 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974). 
26. Similarly, when multiple CGL policies issued in different years potentially 
cover the same loss, insurers sometimes argue that the insured can claim coverage 
under only one of these policies or - if there are not only primary, but also excess pol­
icies - one of these years. There is evidence in the drafting history of the 1966 revi­
sion of the CGL policy, however, that insurers anticipated this issue and consciously 
decided not to address it in the revised version of the policy. See Montrose Chem. Corp. 
v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 878, 891 (Cal. 1995) (en bane). The fact that the drafters 
anticipated this problem would of course be highly relevant under a foresight approach, 
but irrelevant under a hindsight approach. 
27. 707 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1983). 
28. 707 F.2d at 779. The policy at issue in Vlastos provided, "Warranted that the 
3rd floor is occupied as (a] Janitor's residence." 707 F.2d at 776. The insurer denied 
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Making ambiguous policy language more clear, however, is not al­
ways a matter of merely adding a word or substituting a clear phrase for 
a vague one. Sometimes the problem is that the issue addressed by pu­
tatively ambiguous policy language is sufficiently complex, or involves 
enough permutations, that a much longer and more detailed provision 
would be required to improve upon the policy language that was actu­
ally employed. In this situation resolving the perfectibility issue would 
require a court to address the optimal length, complexity, and precision 
of the policy provision in question. For example, standard liability in­
surance policies impose on the insurer a duty to defend the insured 
against any suit alleging a liability that would fall within coverage if 
proved.29 The policies do not indicate the scope of the insurer's duty 
when a complaint contains some counts alleging liability that would fall 
within coverage if proved, and other counts alleging liability that would 
not fall within coverage even if proved. Nor does the typical duty-to­
defend provision indicate the scope of the insurer's duty when the alle­
gations of the complaint against the insured, if proved, would fall 
within coverage, but facts extrinsic to the complaint indicate that there 
would not be coverage - for instance, because the actual, as distin­
guished from the alleged, conduct of the insured falls within an exclu­
sion.30 It is not surprising that when the ambiguity of policy provisions 
such as those embodying the duty to defend is at issue, the courts rarely 
acknowledge their use of an implicit negligence standard. Acknowl­
edgement would threaten to make admissible such evidence as drafting 
standards within the insurance industry, factors that were and reasona­
bly should have been taken into account in fashioning the policy lan­
guage at issue, alternative verbal formulations that the drafters did and 
coverage of a fire loss because the evidence showed that a massage parlor occupied a 
portion of the third floor along with the Janitor's residence. The court suggested that the 
addition of the word "solely" between "occupied" and "as" could easily have ren­
dered the provision unambiguous. See 707 F.2d at 779. 
29. The standard CGL insurance policy provides: 
We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as 
damages because of "bodily injury" or "property damage" to which this insur­
ance applies .. '.. We will have the right and duty to defend any "suit" seeking 
those damages. 
INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, INC., COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY 
(1984), reprinted in ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW, supra note 1, at 440 (emphasis 
added). 
30. The most common such example involves cases in which the insured is al­
leged to have acted negligently (a covered liability) but in fact acted expecting or in­
tending harm (for which coverage of liability is excluded). See, e.g., Montrose Chem. 
Corp. v. Superior Court, 861 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1993) (en bane). 
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should have considered, and the cost of the coverage afforded by those 
alternative formulations. 
The prospect that insurance coverage suits would be encumbered 
by disputes over the significance of these sorts of evidence surely deters 
courts from openly embracing a negligence standard. What the courts 
have not done expressly, however, they have done by implication. In­
stead of interpreting the duty-to-defend provision in favor of coverage 
in every instance in which it might be read to afford this protection, 
courts have constructed a complex web of rules detailing the circum­
stances under which the insurer does and does not have a duty to 
defend.31 
Interestingly, while courts occasionally acknowledge the perfect­
ibility standard when they hold that a policy provision is ambiguous, 
they virtually never acknowledge their use of this standard when they 
hold that a disputed policy provision is not ambiguous. In the former 
situation, stating that the ambiguous policy provision could have been 
perfected merely adds weight to the decision. But in the latter situation, 
reference to the perfectibility standard would constitute an admission 
that, in fact, not all ambiguous policy provisions are interpreted against 
the drafter. The result is that, probably more often than they are willing 
to admit, courts consider a disputed policy provision to be reasonably 
susceptible to more than one meaning-"ambiguous" -but they rule 
that the provision is unambiguous. The difficulty that observers of in­
surance disputes encounter in accurately predicting when a court will 
invoke contra proferentem could be reduced measurably if those ob­
servers recognized that something like a perfectibility test is sometimes 
applied to claims that a provision is ambiguous. This recognition, how­
ever, only gets us half the way to an understanding of how contra 
proferentem operates in practice. 
B. The Policyholder Demand Stan dard 
The second dimension of assessment that influences the ambiguity 
decision involves the degree of policyholder demand for the coverage 
that would be supplied to the policyholder by a fmding that the policy 
language in question is ambiguous. As irt the case of the linguistic stan­
dard of care, there are two possible approaches to evaluating the degree 
31. See KENNETII s. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RisK: INSURANCE, LEGAL 
THEoRY, AND PuBuc POLICY 195-203 (1986). The actual content of these rules ap­
pears to be detennined at least as much by the policyholder-demand considerations that 
I describe in the next section as by the perfectibility standard. My point here is that 
strict liability is typically rejected as the governing standard. 
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of policyholder demand for the disputed coverage. Once the linguistic 
standard of care to which the court subscribes is shown to have been 
breached, the choice between these two approaches determines whether 
the policyholder is granted relief - that is, whether the policy provi­
sion in question is actually declared to be ambiguous. 
1. The Penalty Standard 
Under what might be called a penalty standard,32 the degree of pol­
icyholder demand for the coverage at issue is irrelevant to the ambigu­
ity decision. Under a penalty standard the insured is entitled to the cov­
erage afforded by a pro-coverage interpretation of the purportedly . 
ambiguous policy provision, even if most policyholders would not want 
to pay for such coverage if given the choice. The standard thus accom­
plishes what its name suggests: it penalizes the insurer for including 
ambiguous language in its policy. 
A leading example of the use of a penalty standard is Rusthoven v. 
Commercial Standard Insurance Co.,33 in which the policy contained in­
consistent policy provisions. Rusthoven was injured by an uninsured 
motorist while driving a vehicle owned by his employer. The em­
ployer's auto policy provided coverage of losses caused by uninsured 
motorists, and the premium was based on the employer's gross receipts. 
At the time of the accident there were 67 autos in the employer's fleet. 
The declarations (cover page) of the policy listed the amount of unin­
sured motorists coverage as $25,000 per person. The policy provided 
that 
[r]egardless of the number of covered autos, insureds, claims made or ve­
hicles involved in the accident, the most we will pay for all damages re­
sulting from any one accident is the limit of UNINSURED MOTORISTS 
INSURANCE shown in the declarations.34 
Elsewhere, however, the policy provided that "If there is more than one 
covered auto our limit of liability for any one accident is the sum of  the 
limits applicable to each covered auto. "35 Rusthoven claimed coverage 
equal to the sum of the per person limits of liability- $25,000 per per-
32. I have borrowed this term from default-rule theory in the contract-law litera­
ture. The term seems to have been used first in Ian Ayers & Robert Gertner, Filling 
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE LJ. 87, 
91 (1989). 
33. 387 N.W.2d 642 (Minn. 1986). 
34. 387 N.W.2d at 643. 
35. 387 N.W.2d at 643 (emphasis added). 
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son - applicable to each covered auto (of which there were 67), or 
$1,675,000.36 
It seems extremely unlikely that Rusthoven's employer, or Rus­
thoven, had he been given the choice, would have chosen to pay premi­
ums to secure this amount of uninsured motorists coverage. Nonethe­
less, the court held that the policy language was ambiguous because it 
contained inconsistent provisions, and awarded Rusthoven that amount 
of coverage. 37 In traditional terms, the rationale for this approach is that 
the insurer, as drafter of the policy, has control over its language and 
should bear the consequences of failing to employ unambiguous lan­
guage.38 As I noted earlier, however, invoking contra proferen tem under 
these circumstances amounts to the rejection of any requirement that 
there have been reliance by the policyholder or that the ambiguous pro­
vision have harmed the policyholder. Rather, under these circumstances 
the insurer pays a penalty for the ambiguity without regard to the de­
gree of demand for the coverage afforded by an interpretation based on 
contra proferentem. 
A penalty standard affords the insurer three choices: (1) the insurer 
may retain the provision as written, recognizing that it will face liability 
under the penalty standard; (2) the insurer may redraft the "offending" 
provision to eliminate its ambiguity; or (3) in at least some jurisdictions 
the insurer may attempt to remedy the ambiguity by dispelling policy­
holders' expectations regarding the meaning of the provision - for ex­
ample, by pointing out the limitations on coverage the insurer intends 
the provision to effectuate. Recent contract-law literature suggests that 
the function of a penalty approach in filling contractual gaps is to force 
the party facing a potential penalty to reach an agreement on a substi­
tute term with the other contracting party. 39 In the insurance setting, 
however, where industrywide standard-form contracts predominate, the 
first alternative is likely to be the cost-minimizing alternative until a 
sufficient number of insurers have paid a sufficient number of penalties 
to warrant investing in the cost of redrafting the policy provision in 
question. 
36. See 387 N.W.2d at 644. 
37. See 387 N.W.2d at 644-45. 
38. See STEMPEL, supra note 1, § 5.9, at 206-07; Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable 
Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L. REv. 323, 327-28 (1986). 
39. For discussion and extensive references, see generally Symposium on Default 
Rules and Contractual Consent, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY LJ. 1 (1993). 
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2. The Majoritarian Sta'!-'1ard 
An alternative approach imports a requirement that is rmssmg 
under the penalty standard. This approach might be called a 
majoritarian standard,40 under which, for a purportedly ambiguous pol­
icy provision to be interpreted in favor of coverage, the coverage must 
be such that the majority of policyholders would prefer to purchase it at 
an actuarially fair price. This standard is similar to the one that many 
contract-law theorists have argued should guide the gap-filling function 
of courts when they resolve disputes over matters that are not expressly 
resolved by contract terms: choose the contract provision to which the 
parties would have agreed had they negotiated over the issue in ques­
tion. 41 No doubt something like this standard often operates when there 
is a gap in an insurance policy.42 My contention, however, is that often 
the courts also implicitly take this approach in order to interpret express 
but ambiguous policy provisions. 
. One can glimpse occasional traces of this approach in the case law. 
For example, the "full" expectations principle directs that the reasona­
ble expectations of the insured be honored, notwithstanding even clear, 
contrary policy language.43 Courts in some states, however, apply a lim­
ited version of the expectations principle that applies only to the inter­
pretation of ambiguous policy provisions.44 Though phrased as a sword 
for the policyholder, this limited version actually is a shield for the in­
surer, for under the rule, the reasonable expectations of the policyholder 
limit the reach of contra proferentem. Under the rule, ambigilous policy 
provisions may not be interpreted against the insurer if the resulting 
coverage could not reasonably be expected.45 
One view is that this formulation is merely a restatement of the 
traditional rule that a policy provision is not ambiguous unless it is 
"reasonably" susceptible to more than one interpretation. But I think 
40. See Ayers & Gertner, supra note 32, at 93. 
41. For discussion of this notion, see Ayers & Gertner, supra note 32, at 87-91. 
For a similar argument in the insurance context, see Fischer, supra note 2, at 1001. 
42. A prominent example is the body of rules that has developed the insurer's duty 
to settle claims against its insured under a liability insurance policy. See Kent R. 
Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REv. 1113 (1990). 
43. See KEETON & Wm1ss, supra note 1, § 6.3(a)(4), at 636. 
44. See Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insur­
ance Law After Two Decades, 51 Omo ST. LJ. 823, 835-36 & n.72 (1990). 
45. See KEETON & Wm1ss, supra note 1, § 6.3(a)(2), at 628 n.4 ("It seems likely 
that there has always been an implicit understanding that ambiguities, which in most 
cases might be resolved in more than just one or the other of two ways, would be re­
solved favorably to the insured's claim only if a reasonable person in the insured's posi­
tion would have expected coverage."). 
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that the formulation is more than a mere restatement of the traditional 
rule. The articulated focus of the traditional rule tends to be the policy 
language itself. When courts invoking the traditional rule speak of pol­
icy language that is or is not reasonably susceptible to more than one 
interpretation, typically they mean that the disputed policy provision it­
self, usually standing alone, but at most in the light of the remaining 
policy language, will reasonably bear the policyholder's interpretation.46 
In contrast, the ambiguity decisions that invoke the expectations of the 
policyholder as a limit on the reach of contra proferentem often focus 
on matters beyond the policy language, such as the typical businessper­
son 's unfamiliarity with the distinction between legal and equitable 
remedies,47 the insured's concern that the failure to make a prompt re­
port that it had made a new acquisition would create a gap in its cover­
age, 48 and the expectations of a pesticide manufacturer that its products 
liability insurance would not contain a coverage limitation for "pollu­
tion" that would apply to injuries resulting from the normal use of its 
product.49 
This focus on considerations lying outside the policy language 
comes close to the express adoption of a majoritarian standard. The re­
striction on the scope of contra proferentem embodied in the limited ' 
version of the reasonable expectations principle requires that policy­
holders believe that they are already protected by the coverage they 
claim the ambiguous policy provision affords them. If policyholders do 
believe that they already have the coverage in question, then the premi­
ums they pay insurers probably already reflect this supposition: when I 
think I am buying an eight-cylinder car I naturally am willing to pay 
more than I would for the identical model with six cylinders. Demand 
thus affects price. The only distinction between this expectations­
limited approach to contra proferentem and the majoritarian standard as 
I have defined it is that the former applies as long as policyholders ex­
pect that they have the coverage in question, whereas the latter applies 
only if, in addition, policyholders would be willing to pay an accurate 
price for that coverage. 
46. See Rusthoven v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 387 N.W.2d 642 (Minn. 
1986). 
47. See Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d 175, 
181 (Minn. 1990). 
48. See Cooper Cos. Inc. v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 508, SIS 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995). 
49. See Great Lakes Chem. Co. v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 638 N.E.2d 
847, 851 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). 
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Most of the time, however, this is likely to be a distinction without 
a difference. In most cases in which policyholders expect that they have 
the coverage in question they probably also already are paying for it, 
because of the interaction between demand and price. Admittedly, how­
ever, there may be cases in which policyholders suppose they have the 
coverage in question, the insurer supposes otherwise and has not 
charged for it, and policyholders would not be willing to pay as much 
as the insurer would have charged for providing that coverage if the in­
surer knew that it would be required to do so. In this situation the lim­
ited version of the expectations principle would require that contra 
proferentem be invoked, even though the majoritarian standard as I have 
defined it would not be satisfied. 
But the courts are only rarely in a position to find the facts that 
would be necessary to distinguish between these two slightly different 
approaches. To draw such a distinction, a court would have to be able 
to determine whether the majority of policyholders does or does not 
reasonably expect the coverage in question, whether these policyholders 
are or are not already paying for the coverage they reasonably expect, 
and whether these policyholders would or would not be willing to pay 
an accurate price for that coverage if they knew that they had to ch9ose 
whether to purchase it. 
The courts make no such determinations. Interestingly, to the ex­
tent that they even admit that these considerations are relevant, in prac­
tice the courts treat them as questions of law. They address these con­
siderations in an empirically casual manner or as a matter of logic, as if 
somehow this treatment justifies dispensing with the factual predicates 
of a finding regarding the coverage expectations of most policyholders. 
The result is that the courts often simply assert that the policyholder's 
proposed interpretation of a contested policy provision is reasonable, 
that the provision is therefore ambiguous, and that contra proferentem 
applies. In contrast, when courts conclude that the majoritarian standard 
has not been satisfied, they either invoke the expectations limit on .the 
scope of contra proferentem, or simply state that the disputed policy 
provision is not ambiguous. In these cases the unarticulated majoritarian 
standard, not the degree of linguistic clarity of the disputed provision, 
decides the issue. 
An insurer seeking to minimize costs under a majoritarian standard 
is even less likely to redraft the provision than under a penalty standard, 
because policyholders are likely to be paying for the coverage in ques-
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tion already.50 In this situation it obviously would not be in the insurer's 
interest to redraft so as to eliminate coverage. Yet the insurer also 
would have little to gain and something to lose by redrafting so as to 
clarify that there is coverage of the kind at issue. This is because some 
insureds will claim coverage under the existing provision, but some will 
be misled by it and make no claims. In contrast, for the same premiums 
the insurer would probably receive more claims under a redrafted and 
clarified policy provision. Thus, although ambiguities in insurance poli­
cies are likely to persist for some time when they provide coverage for 
which the majority of policyholders would not be willing to pay an ac­
tuarially fair premium, ambiguities will persist to an even greater extent 
when the majoritarian standard is in fact satisfied. 
ill. THE APPROACHES COMBINED 
The courts employ either of two linguistic standards of care and ei­
ther of two policyholder-demand standards in assessing the ambiguity 
of insurance policy provisions. It turns out, therefore, that there are four 
possible conceptions of contra proferentem rather than merely one. The 
four possibilities are reflected in the following matrix. Each cell repre­
sents one of the different possible approaches to the interpretation of ar­
guably ambiguous policy language. 
Negligence Negligence 
Majoritarian Standard Penalty Standard 
Strict Liability Strict Liability 
Majoritarian Standard Penalty Standard 
In the following analysis I discuss each of these four approaches, build­
ing from the most narrow to the most broad, and therefore leaving the 
traditional conception of contra proferentem - the lower right cell -
until last. This strategy of presentation helps to explain most clearly the 
50. An insurer faced with a judicial finding of ambiguity in a case in which the 
majoritarian standard is satisfied - i.e., where policyholders already are likely to be 
paying for the coverage in question - has the same three choices noted earlier: (1) re­
tain the provision as written and risk future liability; (2) redraft; or (3) in some jurisdic­
tions, remedy the ambiguity by dispelling policyholders' expectations regarding the 
meaning of the provision. 
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reason for unacknowledged departures from the traditional conception, 
as well as the overall normative appeal of the traditional approach. 
A. Negligence Liability with a Majoritarian·Standard 
This narrowest of the four approaches is expressly limited to the 
situation in which contra proferentem has the most obvious normative 
appeal. Here the policy provision whose meaning is disputed is perfect­
ible, and the majority of policyholders would be willing to pay for the 
coverage that would be provided by contra proferentem. Indeed, under 
a number of circumstances there is a synergy between the two features 
of this conception. On the one hand, policyholders may suppose that 
they have the coverage in question, and as a consequence they may 
have been paying premium rates that have already compensated the in­
surer for that coverage. In this situation even the insurer that is unaware 
of the potential ambiguity of the disputed policy provision cannot rea­
sonably object to the application of contra proferentem because it has 
been paid for the broader coverage afforded by the doctrine. Moreover, 
at least sometimes the insurer will not be innocently unaware of the po- · 
tential ambiguity. Rather, the insurer's argument that the policy provi­
sion is not susceptible to two reasonable interpretations will be disin­
genuous. On the other hand, if policyholders desire the coverage in 
question and the insurer has not been charging for it, then invoking con­
tra proferentem will be market enhancing, given that the insurer has 
been missing the opportunity to sell coverage for which there is de­
mand. In this latter situation one might even say that the insurer has 
been negligent not only in drafting ambiguous policy language, but also 
in failing to provide and charge for the coverage in question. 
The majoritarian standard has normative appeal not only when the 
majority of policyholders would wish to purchase the coverage that in­
vocation of contra proferentem would provide, but also when they 
would not. In rare cases a court may actually state that the policy provi­
sion in question is linguistically ambiguous but that because the pro­
posed interpretation would not accord with the objectively reasonable 
expectations of the majority of policyholders, it will not be interpreted 
in favor of coverage. For example, in the recent and much-discussed 
decision of Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Insurance Co.,51 the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey was �ked by a policyholder to impose joint and 
several coverage responsibility on the policyholder's insurers over a pe­
riod of years for the policyholder's asbestos-related liabilities on the 
51.  650 A.2d 974 (NJ. 1994). 
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ground that the policies were ambiguous as to the method of allocating 
coverage responsibility among these "triggered" policies.52 The court 
first posed the question, "Does the Language of the Policies Resolve 
the Allocation Issue?" and next answered, "We are unable to find the 
answer to allocation in the language of the policies," but then rejected 
both the policyholder's and the insurer's proposed interpretations, in­
stead fashioning what the court termed the most "efficient" approach.53 
The court directed a special master to provide the coverage that, in ef­
fect, policyholders would have selected had they been able to make the 
choice. This degree of candor, however, is unusual. 
B. Strict Liability with a Majoritarian Stan dard 
This approach has muFh the same normative appeal as the first, ex­
cept that the policy language in question need not be reasonably per­
fectible to invoke contra proferentem. Of course, it does not follow that 
the language in question is not reasonably perfectible. This approach 
simply does not require an inquiry into that issue. The difference be­
tween this approach and the first, therefore, is that 1:1nder this approach, 
contra proferentem applies not only to policy prdvisions that are per­
fectible, but also to those that are not. What can be gained by applying 
contra proferentem to this additional increment of nonperfectible policy 
provisions? 
There are three arguments for including this increment within the 
sweep of contra proferentem. First, as I noted above, the move to strict 
liability reduces litigation costs by making the perfectibility issue irrele­
vant in coverage disputes. Second, the ambiguous policy language itself 
- as distinguished from some independent expectation - may have 
led some policyholders to assume that they were provided coverage by 
the language in question and to rely to their detriment on that assump­
tion. For example, had the policyholder known that the policy precluded 
the coverage in question, the policyholder might have purchased the 
coverage elsewhere if it had been available, or may have taken precau­
tionary measures that could have avoided the loss for which it now 
claims coverage. Finally, suppose that the vast majority of ambiguous 
policy provisions are in fact perfectible, but that distinguishing those 
that are perfectible from those that are not is an unreliable process. In 
52. In the language of this field, a CGL insurance policy is "triggered" if bodily 
injury or property damage falling within the terms of coverage occurred "during the 
policy period." See KENNETH s. ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY INSUR· 
ANCE LAW 91-102 (1991) [hereinafter ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY]. 
53. Owens-Illinois, 650 A.2d at 988-96. 
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that case a rule that classified all such provisions as ambiguous could 
produce a lower rate of error (i.e., the percentage of cases in which a 
nonperfectible policy provision is held to be ambiguous) than the rate 
of error under a negligence test itself (i.e., the percentage of cases in 
which a perfectible policy provision is held not to be ambiguous). Even 
assuming that the theoretically optimal linguistic standard is negligence 
rather than strict liability, because of the risk of error in adjudicating the 
negligence issue a strict liability standard may in this way generate 
more accurate determinations than negligence. 
Moreover, an approach that expressly adhered to strict liability, but 
then silently departed from that standard in cases of very obvious 
nonperfectibility, would produce an even lower rate of error, as judged 
from the standpoint of the theoretically optimal negligence standard. 
One might describe such cases as involving a finding of non­
perfectibility by judicial .11otice to distinguish them from cases that 
would require evidence even to support a finding of nonperfectibility as 
a matter of law. 
C. Negligence Liability with a Penalty Standard 
This approach is the mirror image of strict liability with a 
majoritarian standard. The approach captures all the cases in which a 
policy provision is perfectible and the majority of policyholders would 
purchase the coverage at issue, plus the increment of cases in which the 
relevant policy provision is perfectible but the majority of policyholders 
would not wish to purchase the coverage in question. Admittedly, on 
the surface this approach lacks the appeal of the two that employ a 
majoritarian standard because under this approach the policyholder 
probably gets something for nothing. That is, when the majority of poli­
cyholders would not purchase the coverage in question, it is unlikely 
that market conditions have been permitting or would permit the insurer 
to charge for this coverage even while ambiguously declining to pro­
vide it. 
Nonetheless, under this approach there is a synergy between the 
linguistic and demand dimensions of contra proferentem that gives it an 
appeal that is lacking under strict liability with a majoritarian standard. 
Here the insurer has employed a policy provision that is perfectible. For 
this reason the insurer could have avoided liability simply ·by perfecting 
the provision, and it can do so in the future. Application of contra 
proferentem therefore serves as a simple signal to the insurer that the 
provision should be perfected, and ordinarily such application should be 
unobjectionable unless redrafting costs are prohibitively high. 
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This approach also can generate some of the same benefits as strict 
liability with a majoritarian standard. The approach entails lower litiga­
tion costs because it avoids the need to assess the degree of policy­
holder demand for the relevant coverage. Because of the probable diffi­
culty of making such assessments accurately, this approach also may 
entail lower error costs, especially if in the vast majority of litigated 
cases the majoritarian standard would be satisfied but it would be diffi­
cult to prove this fact. 
Finally, recall that under strict liability with a majoritarian standard 
the courts might take "judicial notice" of the obvious nonperfectibility 
of an ambiguous policy provision and thereby reduce the rate of error 
under that approach. A corresponding move might be made under negli­
gence liability with a penalty standard, by taking judicial notice of the 
occasional obvious failure of a linguistically ambiguous policy provi­
sion to satisfy the majoritarian standard, and declining to invoke contra 
proferentem to interpret that provision. In this manner the rate of error 
- as compared to negligence liability with a majoritarian standard -
could be reduced even further. 
D. Strict Liability with a Penalty Stan dard: The Traditional 
Conception 
The traditional conception of contra proferentem goes further than 
any of the other approaches standing alone, but no further than what the 
other approaches could do in combination. The traditional conception 
imposes coverage responsibility when the policy provision whose mean­
ing is in dispute is perfectible and when the majority of policyholders 
would have purchased the coverage in question. But under the tradi­
tional conception of contra proferentem an ambiguous policy provision 
also results in coverage when the policy provision at issue could not 
reasonably be perfected and when the majority of policyholders would 
not have purchased the coverage in question. Consequently, the case for 
the traditional conception must be that it combines the advantages of 
the other three, narrower approaches to contra proferen tem. In doing so, 
however, it also risks disadvantages. I discuss both below. 
1. Advantages 
The traditional conception has a number of advantages. The trans­
action-cost case for the traditional conception is obvious: by dispensing 
with the kinds of inquiries that would be necessary to satisfy the per­
fectibility and majoritarian standards, the traditional conception makes 
the ambiguity decision simple, straightforward, and inexpensive. By 
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employing a strict liability standard the traditional conception also as­
sures coverage in any case in which a policyholder has been misled by 
ambiguous language and thereby suffered a loss that otherwise would 
have been insured or avoided. Furthermore, the traditional conception 
assures coverage to the minority of policyholders who have detrimen­
tally relied on the policy provision in question, either because had they 
known there was no coverage they would have purchased the coverage 
in question elsewhere, or because they believed that in fact they did 
purchase this coverage. 
Moreover, the traditional conception has the potential to reduce the 
costs of error in achieving the aims of the other approaches. To apply 
the negligence and majoritarian standards accurately, a court would 
often have to be presented with substantial amounts of information, 
much of it difficult to obtain and difficult to sort through. If it is a fair 
presumption that most linguistically imperfect policy provisions are rea­
sonably perfectible, and that the majority of policyholders would be 
willing to pay an accurate premium for the coverage that would be af­
forded by a pro-coverage interpretation of the majority of such provi­
sions, then the traditional conception will produce results that are a 
close approximation of the ideal, without incurring the transaction and 
other costs that accompany the alternatives to the traditional conception. 
Finally, for the reasons noted earlier, insurers have incentives that 
promote the persistence of ambiguous policy provisions even in the face 
of contra proferentem. The traditional conception imposes the risk of ir­
remediable ambiguity on the enterprises that are most likely to be the 
superior bearer of that risk - insurance companies, which are in the 
business of risk bearing. 
2. Disadvq.ntages 
The principal argument against the traditional conception is that it 
is simplistic in its disregard of otherwise normatively relevant consider­
ations. The question is whether this disadvantage is worth its advan­
tages. For example, if most policy provisions that fail the "ordinary 
reader" test are not reasonably perfectible, or if the majority of policy­
holders do not wish to purchase the coverage afforded them by applying 
the traditional conception, then error costs probably are higher under 
the traditional conception than under the others.54 In addition, the pen­
alty standard employed by the traditional conception may generate ei-
54. Whether the error costs generated by the traditional conception are higher 
under these circumstances still depends, however, on the error rate associated with each 
of the other approaches. The traditional conception may still be superior on this score, 
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tiler of two otller undesirable results. On tile one hand, all policyholders 
may receive tile coverage resulting from tile penalty standard and be 
charged accordingly, even tllough tile majority may not desire this cov­
erage. Unless tile majority is itself mistaken in supposing tllat tile cover­
age in question is not worfu purchasing at an accurate price, tllis conse­
quence is undesirable. On tile otller hand, at otller times demand for 
coverage generally may be sufficiently elastic and tile cost of tile judi­
cially added coverage sufficiently high tllat insurers find it preferable -
because policyholders find it preferable - to circumvent tile issue en­
tirely by removing tile offending policy provision from tile policy alto­
getller, tllereby declining to provide not only tile judicially added cover­
age, but tile narrower coverage tllat insurers had intended to provide 
and tllat tile majority of policyholders had wished to purchase. 
Under this scenario contra proferentem ultimately results in tile 
availability of less coverage tllan would have been afforded in its ab­
sence.ss Expressed in more vernacular terms, tile paradox is tllat for pol­
icyholders who wish to purchase half a loaf of coverage for half a pre­
mium, tile threat posed by tile traditional conception may result in 
insureds being offered eitller a full loaf of coverage for a full premium, 
or no loaf at all.s6 
even when the vast majority of disputed provisions are not perfectible or desired by 
most policyholders, if the other approaches also are very inaccurate. 
55. I once argued that this is precisely what occurred in connection with the so­
called qualified pollution exclusion in CGL insurance policies written between about 
1970 and 1985. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of In­
surance, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 942, 961-66 (1988). That exclusion contained an excep­
tion for discharges of pollutants that were "sudden and accidental." Some courts held 
this phrase to be ambiguous and (under the traditional conception) therefore interpreted 
it to cover unexpected, gradual discharges. I argued that these interpretations resulted in 
the insurance industry's revision of the standard-form policy to remove virtually all pol­
lution coverage from all CGL policies written beginning in 1986. In effect, insurers 
seem to have concluded that if they could not rely on policy provisions that they be­
lieved limited coverage to liability for short-term, abrupt pollution, they would not in­
sure against pollution liability at all. I implied that the judicial decisions holding the 
"sudden and accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion to be ambiguous were in­
correctly decided. In retrospect, I continue to think that I accurately described the atti­
tude and motives of the insurance industry, but I have since concluded that the proper 
interpretation of the pre-1986 pollution exclusion is a more complicated question than I 
thought at the time. This view is based in part on the representations that the insurance 
industry made to state insurance commissioners when it sought approval of the exclu­
sion in the early 1970s. For discussion of the timing and nature of these representations, 
see ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY, supra note 52, at 145-60. 
56. Cf. Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and Insurance Law: Why In­
surance Contracts Should Not Be Construed Against the Drafter, 30 GA. L. REv. 171, 
237 (1995). 
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E. Assessment 
In theory the courts could select any of the four alternative ap­
proaches to contra proferentem. In my view, however, the key issue is 
which of the two polar approaches should prevail: (1) the approach that 
has the most obvious normative appeal - negligence with a 
majoritarian standard, or (2) the traditional conception - strict liability 
with a penalty standard. This is the key choice because either of the two 
intermediate approaches can only be superior if the advantages of the 
linguistic and demand dimensions typically are not congruent. For ex­
ample, negligence liability with a penalty standard could be superior to 
the other approaches only if the transaction and error costs of the negli­
gence standard were tolerable. Similarly, strict liability with a 
majoritarian standard could be superior to the other approaches only if 
the transaction and error costs of the majoritarian standard were tolera­
ble. Neither of these states of affairs seems likely because the transac­
tion and error costs of the negligence and majoritarian standards, re­
spectively, normally will be high. 
Consequently, the issue is which polar alternative the courts should 
choose. They could reject the traditional conception as overbroad and 
instead inquire expressly and openly, on a case-by-case basis, into the 
perfectibility and degree of demand for coverage under policy provi­
sions that do not satisfy the ordinary-reader test. In the alternative, they 
could adhere to the traditional conception and tolerate its occasional ex­
cesses. I believe that the problems of evidentiary manageability that 
would arise under any of the alternatives to the traditional conception 
probably are not worth the potential gain that would result from em­
ploying them. Nonetheless, in Part V below I analyze these problems 
and suggest some devices that the courts could adopt to attempt to re­
solve them. 
In the end I think that the courts themselves have recognized that 
if an overt choice must be made between the traditional conception and 
any of the alternatives, then the traditional conception is superior. That 
is why the courts almost always formally adhere to the traditional con­
ception, even when they silently depart from it. But having made that 
formal choice, some courts then have tried to have it both ways, ordina­
rily adhering to the traditional conception in both form and substance, 
while making exceptions to it when they can take what amounts to "ju­
dicial notice" that the policy provision in dispute is not reasonably per­
fectible, or that providing the coverage at issue would violate the 
majoritarian standard. In taking this approach the courts have avoided 
the evidentiary and other difficulties they would encounter in applying 
the negligence and majoritarian standards across the board. Otherwise, 
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the traditional conception prevails. This approach may produce substan­
tively optimal results, but it also generates confusion about what the 
courts really are doing in this field. 
IV. RIGHTS AT VARIANCE WITH POLICY PROVISIONS 
" 
The portrait I have sketched cannot be complete without consider­
ing the relation between contra proferentem and certain other doctrines 
that also affect the meaning of insurance policy provisions. Professor 
(now Judge) Robert Keeton's famous identification of this category of 
doctrines creating "rights at variance" with policy provisions57 distin­
guishes in effect between the interpretation of insurance policy lan­
guage and the application of legal doctrines to that policy language. In 
Keeton's view such doctrines as the expectations principle, waiver, es­
toppel, and others act upon the policy language and render that lan­
guage inapplicable or more limited than it would be if it were merely 
interpreted.58 I want to suggest that the development of these rights at 
variance with policy provisions can be explained at least in part, if not 
entirely, by the difficulties that courts face in the interpretive arena. 
The core of the problem arises in cases in which the policy provi­
sion in question could not reasonably have been perfected, but the ma­
jority of policyholders would want and would be willing to pay for the 
coverage that would be afforded by a finding that the relevant provision 
is ambiguous. In such cases, the absence of the coverage claimed by the 
policyholder is likely to trouble courts because most policyholders 
probably believe that they already have this coverage, and in any event 
they would be willing to pay an accurate price for it. For a court that 
adheres to the traditional conception of contra proferentem - which 
applies strict liability and makes the question of perfectibility irrelevant 
- the result is easy: the provision in question is ambiguous. 
In contrast, for any court that has formally adhered to contra 
proferentem but in fact has employed a negligence standard, the choice 
is not so easy. One option is to invoke contra proferentem and hold the 
policy provision ambiguous. This option, however, requires rejecting 
57. See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance With Policy Provi­
sions (pt 1), 83 HAR.v. L. REv. 961 ,  961-63 (1970); see also KEETON & W101ss, 
supra note 1, § 6.l(a), at 614-16. 
58. See KEETON & W101ss •• supra note 1, § 6.l(a), at 615 (stating that these doc­
trines represent "concepts that have continued to become increasingly significant in the 
resolution of insurance disputes involving claimants who seek to assert rights which are 
not in accord with the provisions of the applicable insurance contract"). Although the 
validity of this kind of distinction between mere interpretation and the giving of legal 
effect to policy language is open to question, I believe that my analysis does not depend 
on whether such a distinction is valid. 
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the court's own private conception of what contra proferentem is really 
all about. The second option for such a court is to hold that the policy 
provision is not ambiguous and, as a result, take its own medicine. The 
former option conflicts with the court's actual jurisprudence, yet the lat­
ter option leaves policyholders without coverage that the court believes 
they want and ought to have. Neither option is very attractive. 
For such a court a more attractive alternative is to develop a doc­
trinal basis for finding that there is coverage, notwithstanding the "un­
ambiguous" policy language. Traditionally this aim was achieved -
when it could be achieved - through doctrines such as waiver and es­
toppel, which focus on specific factual interactions between particular 
policyholders and their insurers.59 The legal significance of these inter­
actions is that they trump policy language, but typically only in the par­
ticular context in which the individual policyholder-plaintiff finds him­
self. For traditional courts this limited kind of effect was probably all 
that seemed appropriate. As judicial lawmaking became more accept­
able over time, however, the c.ases in which there was no viable claim 
of ambiguity, waiver, or estoppel, but in which the majority of policy­
holders expected that they were covered, gave rise to a tension that 
eventually was resolved by the expectations prinCiple. 
The key to understanding the role played by the expectations prin­
ciple, I think, lies in its assurance that the objectively reasonable expec­
tations of the policyholder as to coverage will be honored, notwith­
standing contrary policy language. 60 The requirement that the 
expectations be objectively reasonable is significant not simply because 
it rejects a subjective test, but because objectively reasonable expecta­
tions are those that are likely to be held by the majority of policyhold­
ers. Thus, the expectations principle does for policyholders as a group 
what waiver and estoppel did for the individual policyholder-plaintiff: it 
affords them coverage under policy provisions that are reasonably clear 
under the circumstances, but not sufficiently clear, or at least not suffi­
ciently obvious, to definitively communicate their meaning to the ordi­
nary policyholder. 
Of course, clarity for the ordinary policyholder depends not only 
on the words chosen to limit coverage, but also on the placement of 
those words within the policy. It is no surprise, then, that expectations 
principle cases tend to involve "fine print" exclusions, and that the 
courts invoking the expectations principle sometimes comment that the 
policyholder's expectation of coverage could be dispelled by pointing 
59. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 1 ,  § 6.l(b), at 617-18. 
60. See Henderson, supra note 44, at 825. 
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out the offending provision or by highlighting it within the policy. 61 The 
considerable uncertainty exhibited in the case law and commentary on 
this point,62 however, reflects yet another tension, which the expecta­
tions principle itself creates. Developed as an aid to the majority of pol­
icyholders, the expectations principle - softened by courts that permit 
dispelling individual expectations - may end up retaining the individu­
alized focus of the doctrines of waiver and estoppel that the principle is 
supposed to supplant. Designed to remedy a problem arising out of the 
use of standardized policy language, the principle thus becomes un-
61. See, e.g., Gordinier v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 742 P.2d 277, 285 (Ariz. 
1987) (stating that "[t]he possibility remains that these [exclusions] limitations were 
called to [the insured's] attention" and that "[i]f Aetna can prove this, we will enforce 
the limitation of coverage"); State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bogart, 717 P.2d 449, 
457 (Ariz. 1986) (en bane) ("Such an eventuality is certainly one that should be clearly 
called to the attention of the insured."); Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 174 
(Cal. 1966) (en bane) (limitation on duty to defend would defeat the insured's reasona­
ble expectations because the limitation "is not 'conspicuous' since it appears only after 
a long and complicated page of fine print, and is itself in fine print"); C & J Fertilizer, 
Inc. v. Allied Mut Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 177 (Iowa 1975) (substance of an exclu­
sion was not explained to plaintiff); Simon v. Continental Ins. Co., 724 S.W.2d 210, 
212-13 (Ky. 1986) (automobile policy's underinsured motorist limits, buried in a 
lengthy definitions section, defeated the reasonable expectations of the insured absent a 
clear and conspicuous manifestation of excluded coverage); DiOrio v. New Jersey Mfrs. 
Ins. Co., 398 A.2d 1274, 1280 (NJ. 1979) (automobile policy coverage provisions and 
definitions regarding nonowned automobiles were placed clearly and conspicuously on 
the first page, and thus the insured could have no objectively reasonable expectation of 
the coverage sought); Gerhardt v. Continental Ins. Co., 225 A.2d 328, 333 (N.J. 1966) 
("If the company had acted fairly in the effort to exclude coverage . . . it would have 
given the insured clear notice to that effect on the face page . . .  or by a slip attached to 
the face page . . . .  "); Lehrhoff v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 638 A.2d 889, 892 (N.J. 
Super. Ct App. Div. 1994) ("[R]easonable expectations of coverage raised by the decla­
ration page cannot be contradicted by the policy's boilerplate unless the declaration 
page itself clearly so warns the insured."); Hionis v. Northern Mut. Ins. Co., 327 A.2d 
363, 365 (Pa Super. Ct 1974) ("Even where a policy is written in unambiguous terms, 
the burden of establishing the applicability of an exclusion or limitation involves proof 
that the insured was aware of the exclusion or limitation and that the effect thereof was 
explained to him."). 
62. For example, some courts have held that an insured's reasonable expectations 
survive coverage limitations despite the insured's apparent knowledge of the limitations. 
See, e.g., Smith v. Westland Life Ins. Co., 539 P.2d 433, 441-42 (Cal. 1975) (en bane) 
(when reasonable expectation of coverage was created by the insurer's acceptance of a 
premium with the application for coverage, if the insurer wishes to counter the expecta­
tion "it must not only use clear and unequivocal language evidencing its intent to limit 
temporary coverage . . .  [and] call such limiting condition to the attention of the appli­
cant," but must also return the tendered premium); Sparks v. St Paul Ins. Co., 495 A.2d 
406, 414-15 (NJ. 1985) (in most insurance contracts "consent can be inferred only to 
the extent that the policy language conforms to public expectations and commercially 
reasonable standards"; absent "proof of factual circumstances that would render such 
limited . . .  coverage both reasonable and expected," the policy limitation did not sat­
isfy the objectively reasonable expectations of the purchaser). 
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available to policyholders who have been made individually aware of 
otherwise unexpected policy provisions. The effect of this approach is 
to destandardize policy language by affording coverage to the majority 
while denying it to the exceptional policyholder whose expectation has 
been specifically dispelled. 
This distinction between approaches that do and do not permit 
proof that the policyholder's expectations were dispelled involves much 
more than the creation of an occasional exception to the expectations 
principle. The distinction reflects the difference between the tort and 
contract views of the normative basis of contra proferentem that I iden­
tified earlier. In tort-law terms, if the expectations principle applies only 
when the policyholder subjectively expected coverage, then the princi­
ple includes something like a requirement that the policyholder be 
harmed by a coverage-limiting policy provision. This requirement is 
closely analogous to the tort-law requirement that the defendant's 
wrong be a cause of the plaintiff's injury. On the other hand, in con­
tract-law terms, when the subjective expectation of the policyholder 
claiming coverage is irrelevant, because the only requirement is that the 
objectively reasonable expectations of the majority of policyholders be 
honored, something like expectation damages are awarded. As in the 
typical case of contract breach, proof of reliance is not required, be­
cause the particular policyholder's lack of reliance - that is to say lack 
of expectation of coverage - is irrelevant. 
The distinction between approaches that do and do not permit the 
dispelling of individual. expectations also replicates the choice between 
negligence and strict liability under contra proferentem, which I sug­
gested actually prompted development of the expectations principle in 
the first place.63 Ordinarily an expectation of coverage either can be 
cost-effectively dispelled across the board, or it cannot. The problem is 
much like providing an effective warning to accompany a consumer 
product. A fine-print exclusion can be highlighted,64 or selling agents 
can be directed to point it out,65 or the marketing strategy that creates 
the expectation can be modified,66 or else none of these expectation-
63. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59. 
,64. See, e.g., Gerhardt, 225 A.2d at 333; Lehrhoff, 638 A.2d at 892. 
65. See, e.g., Gordinier, 742 P.2d at 285; C & J Fertilizer, 227 N.W.2d at 177 (re­
jecting defendant's assertion that contra proferentem does not apply because plaintiff 
knew the policy contained the provision, and observing that the "escape clause . . .  was 
never read to or by plaintiff's personnel, nor was the substance explained by defend­
ant's agent"). 
66. See, e.g., Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 377 P.2d 284, 288, 
293-94 (Cal. 1962) (en bane) (holding that when airline trip insurance policy was mar­
keted through a vending machine close to the time of departure, required the insured to 
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dispelling measures can be taken. When taking one of these or a similar 
measure is feasible and cost-effective, then a holding that a policyholder 
had an objectively reasonable expectation of coverage is, in effect, a 
holding that the insurer has been negligent in failing to dispel policy­
holder expectations generally.67 In expectations principle cases an ap­
proach that makes any particular policyholder's expectations relevant 
therefore employs what amounts to a negligence standard governing the 
insurer's marketing behavior.68 
In contrast, an approach that makes any particular policyholder's 
expectations irrelevant and directs attention to the expectations of poli­
cyholders generally employs what amounts to strict liability. If the ma­
jority of policyholders reasonably expect the coverage in question, then 
regardless of whether the insurer has dispelled the expectations of the 
policyholder-plaintiff, apparently it is not cost-effective to dispel expec­
tations generally. If the insurer is nonetheless liable for the consequence 
of its marketing behavior, logically this is strict liability for marketing 
behavior. 
When this strict liability feature of the expectations principle is 
combined with the contract approach that makes any particular policy­
holder's expectation irrelevant, the result is strict liability for failure to 
provide coverage that the majority of policyholders reasonably expects. 
This strong version of the expectations principle in effect imposes lia­
bility on insurers for the breach of an implied promise to provide ex­
pected coverage. Ironically, then, the judicial reluctance to accept the 
strict liability feature of the traditional conception of contra proferentem 
has given way to a willingness to disregard unambiguous policy lan­
guage in the service of majoritarian expectations. What began at least in 
part as a response to an interpretive bind has thus been transformed into 
judicial prescription of the contents of insurance policies. 
mail the policy to the beneficiary prior to departure, and did not provide a duplicate 
copy, the insured had a reasonable expectation that substituted emergency transportation 
would be covered absent a clear manifestation of the limitation to the purchaser). 
67. Occasional exceptions to this generalization include cases involving particular 
acts of negligence, such as an agent who fails to follow a directive that an unexpected 
exclusion be pointed out. 
68. It is not necessarily inconsistent for a court that has implicitly held a policy 
provision to be sufficiently clear under all relevant circumstances - i.e., nonnegligently 
drafted - to also hold that the insurer's marketing behavior is nonetheless negligent. 
Under some circumstances the optimal approach to communicating the policy's mean­
ing may well be to leave the policy language as it stands but to clarify its meaning by 
some extracontractual method of explanation. 
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V. THE PROBLEMS OF EVIDENTIARY MANAGEABILITY OUTSIDE 
THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTION 
It may have been possible until now for courts to camouflage, or 
even fail to recognize, their own departures from the traditional concep­
tion of contra proferentem. Once these departures are identified, how­
ever, the appropriate course of action is either to return to the traditional 
conception or openly to embrace a new approach. I think that the diffi­
culties inherent in expressly departing from the traditional conception of 
contra proferentem are not worth the advantages of doing so. It is at 
least plausible to suppose that the traditional conception entails lower 
error and transaction costs than any of the alternatives. The traditional 
conception certainly affords greater predictability. 
But if courts are going to depart from the traditional conception by 
engaging in the decisionmaking process I have described, then both jus­
tice and common sense demand that they be more candid about what 
they are doing. Greater candor will take some of the mystery out of the 
interpretive process and enable the parties to direct their arguments to 
the factors that actually influence the courts. However, the very consid­
erations that have led the courts to be less than candid about these fac­
tors suggest that greater candor alone will not necessarily improve the 
process. Rather, modified rules that deal with the problems of eviden­
tiary manageability and recognize the limits of judicial competence will 
be needed. 
1\vo major uncertainties have probably contributed to the fiction 
that contra proferentem always involves strict liability and a penalty 
standard. First, while courts may feel some confidence in their ability to 
know a poorly drafted policy provision when they see it, they are also 
likely to recognize that they may be unaware of considerations relevant 
to the way in which the provision was drafted. For courts to acknowl­
edge that they are employing a negligence standard therefore either 
would make them vulnerable to criticism for acting without sufficient 
evidence to support their decisions, or would subject them to mogntains 
of evidence that would transform simple legal issues into complex ques­
tions of fact. Second, whereas a penalty standard asks nothing of the 
courts, an explicit majoritarian standard would . pose evidentiary 
problems very similar to those that would be posed by employing a 
negligence standard. As citizens themselves, judges may think that they 
can reliably intuit the coverage expectations of the majority of policy­
holders, but they are also likely to recognize that intuition is no substi­
tute for evidence regarding a question of fact, especially if the question 
is posed to a jury. 
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Departing from the traditional conception only when a policy pro­
vision self-evidently seems not to be perfectible or the coverage in 
question clearly would not be purchased by the majority of policyhold­
ers is a reaction to these uncertainties. But this de facto requirement that 
departures from the traditional conception take place only when it can 
be concluded virtually by "judicial notice" that the unstated standard 
has not been breached is only a partial solution. This approach avoids 
the need for factfinding by juries, but it does nothing to enable litigants 
themselves to address the relevant issues, even if the issues are to be 
decided by the court without traditional factfinding. If there are to be le­
gitimate, limited departures from the traditional conception, then there 
will have to be at least some effort to allow litigants to address relevant 
issues. 
A. The Linguistic Standard of Care 
The key here would be to permit the parties to address the perfect­
ibility of the policy language whose meaning is in question without 
opening the door to virtually unlimited amounts of evidence about that 
question. The best way to do this would be through a hindsight perfect­
ibility standard, which would make the decisionmaking process more 
visible without radically changing its current character. Under a hind­
sight standard the policyholder could demonstrate the ambiguity of the 
policy provision in question not merely by showing that the provision is 
reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning, but also by identify­
ing alternative language that would have been more suitable to achieve 
the insurer's aim, given the insurer's contention that the policyholder's 
claim is not covered. No other evidence directed at the question 
whether the relevant policy language is reasonably perfectible, however, 
would be admitted. 
Under this approach the ambiguity decision would remain a ques­
tion for the court, not a question of fact for the jury. By avoiding the 
foresight issue, the approach would not degenerate into an evidentiary 
inquiry into the considerations that might have been relevant to the ac­
ceptability of the alternative language prepared by the policyholder. The 
focus would still be on the language of the policy provision in question, 
not on the quality of the drafter's conduct or on the factors that affected 
the drafter's choice of language. As a consequence, the proposed 
change would only minimally disrupt trial-level litigation, if at all. The 
ambiguity inquiry would be pursued, much as it is now, on motion for 
partial summary judgment or motion in limine, and appellate courts 
therefore could continue to scrutinize the ambiguity decisions of lower 
courts. 
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Whether this approach would be both workable and superior to the 
de facto, unacknowledged departures from contra proferentem that now 
occur is uncertain. For example, insurers might argue that the approach 
unfairly favors policyholders, by permitting the policyholder to identify 
alternative, apparently more suitable policy language, without permit­
ting the insurer to refute the contention that the policyholder's proposed 
alternative language would have been more suitable than the actual pol­
icy language. 
Although it is true that insurers would in a sense be placed at this 
disadvantage, they probably would be no more disadvantaged under this 
approach than they are when the traditional conception is in force. In­
surers would not be precluded from criticizing the alternative policy 
language identified by the policyholder . .  The approach would make evi­
dentiary criticism of the policyholder's proposed alternative language 
inadmissible, but would not rule out what might be termed argumenta­
tive criticism. Neither the policyholder nor the insurer would be permit­
ted to offer evidence, based on fact or on expert opinion, going to the 
· suitability of the policy language actually used by the insurer or offered 
as an alternative by the policyholder. But just as the policyholder could 
offer alternative language, so the insurer could criticize it, logically or 
linguistically, for unsuitability. Just as the parties now argue, often with­
out resort to any evidence at all, about whether disputed policy lan­
guage is ambiguous, under the new standard they would be permitted to 
argue about the strengths and weaknesses of the policyholder's pro­
posed alternative language as compared to the actual policy language. 
Thus, the insurer would be permitted to argue that the proposed al­
ternative was even more ambiguous than the language actually con­
tained in the policy, or that the language would not mesh with - or ac­
tually would contradict - other language in the policy. Arguments that 
stayed within the four comers of the insurance policy and the policy­
holder's proposed alternative would be permitted. From the insurer's 
standpoint this approach would at the least be no worse than the current 
state of affairs. Even at present presumably the policyholder should be 
permitted to offer aJ,ternative policy language in order to demonstrate, 
albeit indirectly, the linguistic ambiguity of a policy provision. The dif­
ference is that under the new standard such alternative language would 
help to demonstrate not simply that the actual policy language is sus­
ceptible to more than one meaning, but also that the alternative provi­
sion offered is more suitable. The operative standard of judgment there­
fore would be candidly acknowledged. 
Although the hypothesized approach probably would be a second­
best solution, it is impossible to know whether policyholders or insurers 
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as a group would gain greater benefit from the approach. On the one 
hand, insurers might gain if courts more consciously employed a negli­
gence rather than a strict liability standard. On the other hand, certain 
policyholders who would fail today in their efforts to invoke contra 
proferentem might gain from the opportunity to address their arguments 
expressly to the negligence standard actually employed by the courts, 
and as a consequence might find themselves prevailing in cases that 
previously they would have lost. 
B. The Demand Dimension 
A penalty standard of course poses no evidentiary difficulties for 
the courts, because when such a standard is in force, a finding for the 
policyholder follows automatically from a finding of linguistic ambigu­
ity, however defined. In contrast, a majoritarian standard requires infor­
mation about the coverage. preferences of policyholders before a result 
can be reached. Notwithstanding the greater normative appeal of a 
majoritarian standard, however, it would be extremely undesirable to re­
quire or even permit an ordinary interpretive dispute to be encumbered 
by evidence from experts, market surveys, and the like, regarding poli­
cyholder coverage preferences. 
Moreover, the difficulty here is not simply the amount of evidence 
that would encumber interpretive disputes, but how factfinding could 
ever proceed effectiv¥1Y once that evidence were admitted. Other things 
being equal, all policyholders prefer broader to narrower coverage. The 
crux of a majoritarian standard cannot be simply to discern policyhold­
ers' coverage preferences without more. Rather, the elasticity of de­
mand for the coverage in question - what policyholders would be will­
ing to pay - is the core question. Assessing the degree of this demand 
for a particular form of coverage, however, is likely to be extremely 
difficult. More important, assessing demand and attempting to satisfy it 
is precisely what markets, including insurance markets, are adept at 
doing. 
Consequently, courts inclined to apply a majoritarian standard 
would do this best not by seeking data about policyholder preferences, 
but by requiring evidence of a market failure that the judicial prescrip­
tion of coverage could solve. Evidence of such market failure would 
consist, for example, of a misleading impression regarding the scope of 
coverage conveyed by the arguably ambiguous policy provision.69 If 
69. If the insurance market has declined (albeit ambiguously) to provide a particu­
lar form of coverage, then one of three possibilities obtains: the majority of policyhold­
ers would not in fact want the coverage at an accurate price; the market has failed to 
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policyholders believe they are already covered against the loss at issue, 
then they are likely already to be paying for such coverage. Not every 
ambiguous policy provision falls in this category, however. Only provi­
sions with which the mass of policyholders is likely to have some gen­
eral familiarity will qualify. Misleading impressions are not created by 
policy provisions that policyholders do not read or know anything 
about. Similarly, not all market failures are judicially correctable. Under 
a majoritarian standard, the insurer would have to be permitted to argue 
that the threat of adverse selection or moral hazard explains its putative 
coverage limitation, and that absent the limitation these phenomena 
would so raise the cost of coverage that the majority of policyholders 
would prefer a policy that includes the disputed coverage limitation, 
sold at the current, lower premium. Permitting the insurer such a de­
fense, however, would exponentially raise the level of complexity of the 
typical dispute over policy interpretation. 
In short, the evidentiary problems of employing a majoritarian 
standard might be partially solved by looking first to the potentially 
misleading character of arguably ambiguous policy provisions, and by 
recognizing that in the absence of misleading provisions, the insurance 
market may well already be satisfying the coverage preferences of the 
majority of policyhold�rs. But to perform even this seemingly contained 
task accurately could pose a very serious challenge for the courts. 
CONCLUSION 
My analysis has attempted to generate both descriptive and norma­
tive insights. As a descriptive matter, the recognition that contra profer­
entem is not one doctrine, but four different possibilities, should help to 
explain the outcome of disputes over the meaning of arguably ambigu­
ous policy language that previously have been difficult to understand. 
Decisions that invoke contra proferentem even when the relevant policy 
language seems optimally clear and most policyholders would not ex­
pect the coverage at issue are applying the strict liability and penalty 
standards that characterize the traditional conception. On the other 
hand, decisions that hold policy language to be unambiguous even 
when that language appears to be susceptible to more than one reasona­
ble interpretation, or that decline to adopt the policyholder's proposed 
interpretation of a policy provision that the court acknowledges to be 
ambiguous, constitute rejections of the traditional conception. These lat-
take advantage of an available gain from trading expanded coverage for higher premi­
ums; or policyholders have inaccurately assumed that the ambiguous policy provision is 
already providing them with the coverage in question. 
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ter decisions employ a negligence standard to assess the linguistic qual­
ity of the disputed policy provision, or they apply the majoritarian de­
mand standard to determine whether an admittedly ambiguous policy 
provision should be construed in favor of coverage, or they do both. 
Litigants and insurance-law scholars alike would do well to recog­
nize, therefore, that the version of contra proferentem that is in force in 
. any particular dispute has a significant effect on the kinds of arguments 
that will appeal to the court and on the outcome of the dispute. Courts 
employing the traditional conception are unlikely to be influenced by 
insurers' efforts to demonstrate that a policy provision that is ambigu­
ous is nonetheless optimally clear. Similarly, such courts are unlikely to 
be influenced by the argument that few policyholders would wish to 
purchase the coverage that would be afforded by construing an arguably 
ambiguous provision in the policyholder's favor. On the other hand, 
precisely these kinds of arguments are likely to influence courts that are 
inclined to depart from the traditional conception. 
As a normative matter, the great advantage of the traditional con­
ception of contra proferentem is that it does not ask more of the courts 
than they are able to deliver. Each of the three alternatives to the tradi­
tional conception of contra proferentem as strict liability with a penalty 
standard involves a more complex and more demanding process of judi­
cial decision. Yet each of these alternatives also promises more precise 
achievement of the value at the core of contra proferentem - assuring 
that poorly drafted policy provisions do not deny policyholders the cov­
erage they wish to purchase. The classic choice must therefore be made 
between a reasonably effective but overbroad rule (the traditional· con­
ception) and an approach (one of the three alternatives) that has the po­
tential to achieve more perfect justice but only with higher transaction 
costs and potentially adverse side effects. 
Moreover, one of the apparent side effects of the courts' reluctance 
to live with this choice has been the development of a strong version of 
the expectations principle that has led the courts to venture over the 
sometimes debatable line between interpretation of insurance policy lan­
guage and regulation of the contents of insurance policies. A weak ver­
sion of contra proferentem may thus lead to stronger versions of the ex­
pectations principle, whereas the traditional conception of contra 
proferentem may more typically be allied with a weaker version of the 
expectations principle that produces less judge-made insurance. 
On balance I prefer the traditional conception of contra profer­
entem and a weaker version of the expectations principle. This combi­
nation leaves the courts to do more of what they are comparatively ca­
pable of doing - interpret - and less of what they tend to do poorly 
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- regulate. While candor about the developments that have resulted in 
departures from the traditional conception is desirable if such departures 
are to continue, a full airing of the complicated and difficult considera­
tions that these departures generate suggests that adherence - or for 
some courts, return - to the traditional conception is likely to be the 
most advisable course of action. 
